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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS IN CASES OF AGENCY TO
BUY REAL ESTATE
By L. W. FEEZER*

Assisted by ALEx

A

RENTT0t

the welter of cases through which the courts are groping for the light of justice are a number in which are met
as contending principles the statute of frauds and the constructive
or resulting trust concept.
It is provided in the statute of frauds, as originally enacted in
the time of Charles II, that interests in land will not be recognized
and enforced through the courts without a writing, except for
short term leases.' At the same time the chancellors, by the use
of the trust concept, had long been giving protection to the interests of persons who had not acquired the complete legal title
to an estate in land, but who in justice and equity were entitled
lo the beneficial interest. in particular real property. Without
repeating anything of the many able expositions of the history
and theory of trusts arising by operation of law, which may be
found in various texts and periodicals, 2 it is enough for the present purpose to say that the trust concept reduced to its simplest
terms is that equity jurisprudence will recognize and protect the
MONG

*Professor of Law, University of South Dakota, Vermillion, S. D.
tSenior Law Student, University of South Dakota.
129 Charles II, ch. 3 (1677) "All leases, estates, interests of freehold
or terms of years or any uncertain interest of, in, to or out of any messuages, manors, lands, tenements or hereditaments made or created by livery
and seizin only or by parole, and not put in writing and signed by the parties
so making or creating the same, or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized by writing, shall have the force and effect of leases or estates at will
only, and shall not either in law or equity be deemed or taken to have any
other or greater force or effect, any consideration for making any such
parole leases or estates or any former law or usage to the contrary notwithstanding."
Section 2 "Except nevertheless leases not exceeding three years from
the making thereof" etc.
'Stone, Resulting Trusts and the Statute of Frauds, (1906) 6 Col. L.
Rev. 326; Scott, The Trust as an Instrument of Law Reform, (1922) 31
Yale L. J. 457; Scott, Conveyances upon Trusts Not Properly Declared,
(1924) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 653; Scott, Purchase Money Trusts, (1927) 40
Harv. L. Rev. 669; Ames. Origin of Uses and Trusts, (1908) 21 Harv. L.
Rev. 261; Costigan, The Classification of Trusts as Express, Resulting and
Constructive, (1914) 27 Harv. L. Rev. 437; Costigan, Trusts Based on
Oral Promises, (1914) 12 Mich. L. Rev. 427, 515.
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party in a situation wherein a legal title to property is vested in
one person who, however, is not entitled to the benefits incident
to the ownership of such title, but who holds it on behalf of
another to whom he is obliged to account for any benefits connected with the property. This concept is the basis for the rationalization of so many and so varied legal relations that its
origin in the ancient feoffments to uses may easily be forgotten.'
The express trust may perhaps be regarded as the natural or
basic situation. The idea of separation of legal or technical from
beneficial or equitable ownership having been worked out in connection with express trusts, it was not a radical or unnatural step
for the chancellors to find a trust in a case where the essential
fact set-up of a trust was shown to exist, even though the intention expressly to create that type of legal relationship was not
proved. These non-express or implied trusts in the course of
time reached a high degree of development, and a complex body
of rules applicable to them came into being. As a preliminary to
considering the specific situation which it is the purpose of this
paper to discuss, it is perhaps worth while to mention the two
well recognized classifications of implied trusts. The type of
implied trust earliest recognized is the resulting trust." This
type of trust had been developed out of the resulting use in a
vast number of instances before the power and scope of its companion concept, the constructive trust, was fully realized. The
distinction is put by Mr. Bogert as follows:
"Implied trusts are trusts declared to exist by courts of equity,
either for the purpose of carrying out the presumed intent of the
parties or to rectify fraud and prevent unjust enrichment. They
are of two cases, namely: resulting trusts, which are declared by
equity to exist because of a presumed intent that they shall exist;
and constructive trusts, which are created by equity as a convenient
means of rectifying fraud and preventing unjust enrichment."-,
The story of the history of these implied trusts is extensively
told in an article by Mr. Scott. 6 Its greatest development was in
connection with the purchase of land with one person's money,
3
See Scott, The Trust as an Instrument of Law Reform, (1922) 31
Yale L J. 457.
4
See articles cited in note 2 supra.
5
Bogert, Trusts 92. For an interesting recent case going at some length
into the distinction between constructive and resulting trusts, see Krzysko
v. Gaudynski,
(1932) 207 Vis. 608, 242 N. W. 186.
6
Scott, The Trust as an Instrument of Law Reform, (1922) 31 Yale

L. J. 457.
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but in the name of another. Constructive trusts, being predicated
upon such uncertain and undefined concepts as "fraud" and "unjust enrichment," probably included a greater variety of situations than the resulting trust classification.
Section seven of the statute of frauds provided in general
7
that trusts in real estate shall be established by a writing. Section eight, however, exempts from the application of section seven
those trusts which arise by operation of law; that is to say, both
resulting and constructive trusts. 8 Therefore, many of the conflicts between parties asserting and denying the existence of a
certain interest in land not covered by any written document may
be resolved by settling the question whether the facts of the
situation bring it within one or the other of these implied trust
categories. Much has been written about the statute of frauds
and resulting trusts, but there seems to have been but little comment upon at least one type of situation in connection with which
the constructive trust concept is often invoked. A skeleton fact
situation will best indicate the problem and the group of cases
which this paper will endeavor to present.
P, desiring to purchase real estate, makes some advances to
another individual A, with regard to having A represent him as
agent for the purpose of making this purchase. It is orally agreed
between them that A will negotiate the purchase on behalf of P
and procure for P such interests as he desires to acquire. A undertakes the negotiations, but instead of carrying out the transactions as P intended he should, A purchases the property with his
own money and procures the conveyance either to himself or to
some straw man for A's benefit. When P offers A the amount
of the purchase price, together with expenses and any compensation which may have been agreed upon, A refuses to convey to P
728 Charles II, ch. 3 (1677), sec. VII. "And be it further enacted by
the authority aforesaid, That from and after said four and twentieth day
of June 1677 all declarations or creations of trusts or confidences of any
lands, tenements or hereditaments, shall be manifested and proved by some
writing signed by the party who is by law enabled to declare such trust, or

by his last will in writing, or else they shall be utterly void and of none
effect."
8
Section VIII of the statute of frauds reads, "Provided always, that
where any conveyances shall be made of any lands or tenements by which
a trust or confidence shall or may arise or result by the implication or construction of law, then and in every such case such trust or confidence shall
be of the like force and effect as the same would have been if this statute
had not been made, anything hereinbefore

withstanding."

contained

to the contrary not-
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and suggests the statute of frauds as sufficient reason why he
cannot be compelled to perform his agreement with P. If P seeks
legal advice, his counsel will undoubtedly consider the problem
from the viewpoint of implied trusts.9
If P has furnished the money with which the vendor was
paid for the property, the situation will undoubtedly be recognized
in almost any jurisdiction as constituting a purchase money resulting trust, and equity will compel a conveyance to P. The
present discussion, however, is to deal with the cases where P did
not furnish the purchase money. If it was understood that A
was to advance the purchase price temporarily, or upon P's note
or under any sort of an understanding which can properly be
interpreted as a loan by the Agent to P, there is less difficulty
than when this factor is absent. In such a case it is the usual
thing to find that the loan or advance of the purchase price by A
is regarded as making P the debtor of A, and the money used, A's
money. This, of course, brings us back into the comfortable fold
of purchase money resulting trusts.'"
9
See the articles above cited for exhaustive lists of cases and comments and also references to exceptions to the general rule. Bogert, Trusts
101 et seq. "It is everywhere held that a resulting trust may be proved by
parol evidences." Bogert, Trusts 95.
The scope of purchase money resulting trusts has been limited by
statute in a number of states. For example the New York statute (Real
Property Law, sec. 94) provides: "A grant of real property for a valuable
consideration, to one person, the consideration being paid by another, is
presumed fraudulent as against the creditors, at that time, of the person
paying the consideration, and, unless a fraudulent intent is disproved, a
trust results in favor of such creditors, to an extent necessary to satisfy
their just demands, but the title vests in the grantee, and no use or trust
results from the payment to the person paying the consideration, or in his
favor, unless the grantee either, 1, Takes the same as an absolute conveyance, in his own name, without the consent or knowledge of the person
paying the consideration; or, 2, in violation of some trust, purchases the
property so conveyed with money or property belonging to another." There
are similar statutes in Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota and Wisconsin.
In Indiana and Kansas a third exception is added: "Where it shall be
made to appear that, by agreement and without fraudulent intent, the party
to whom the conveyance was made, or in whom the title shall vest, was
to hold the land or some interest therein in trust for the party paying the
purchase
money or some part thereof."
' 0 See Herliny v. Coney, (1905) 99 Me. 469, 59 At. 952 and footnotes
in Scott, Cases on Trusts, 2nd ed., p. 432.
As to resulting trusts by way of mortgage where the payer borrows
the purchase price from the grantee to whom the conveyance was made by
way of mortgage see: Scott, Purchase Money Trusts, (1927) 40 Harv. L
Rev. 669, 680-682, 685-688; also the following typical cases; Campbell v.
Freeman, (1893) 99 Cal. 546, 34 Pac. 113; Reeve v. Strawn, (1852) 14 Ill.
94; Wilson v. Hoffman, (1913) 104 Miss. 743, 61 So. 699; Barrow v.Barrow, (1904) 34 Wash. 684, 76 Pac. 305. The very complete annotation in
42 A. L R. 10-125 also includes authorities on this point.
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The real problem arises when there are not present such circumstances as have been regarded adequate to spell out a resulting
trust. Then the possibility of working out a rationale for compelling a conveyance to P may have to be sought in the field of
constructive trusts. The scope of this concept is perhaps not
even yet fully appreciated by the courts which would welcome an
authoritative basis for granting relief in such a case." This
thought is suggested because so many cases have dismissed the
plaintiff in actions of this sort with no more satisfying reason
than that such facts do not constitute a resulting trust.
When we come to consider the possible application of the constructive trust idea, we are faced with the fact that the generalizations about constructive trust call for fraud or unjust enrichment.
All the legal concepts which go by the name of "constructive"
depend in their application and operation upon at least one variable.
Fraud and unjust enrichment supply that element in the case of
constructive trust. Therefore, in cases where one has to consider
whether this theory can be invoked, it is necessary to examine
the cases in order to determine what the courts are calling fraud,
or more accurately what are they treating as fraud in point of the
effect they give to it. If one may assume that courts mean wehal
they say, when they say that a constructive trust must be predicated upon fraud or unjust enrichment, then, in a case which has
been disposed of as a constructive trust, one or both of these
factors must be present. Further, is it necessary to find both
fraud and unjust enrichment or is the latter alone enough? And.
where the courts say both must be present, will they imply the
fraud from the conduct resulting in unjust enrichment?1
Un"Mr. Bogert has apparently suggested that a purchase money trust in
which the payer did not consent to the title being taken in the name of the
grantee should be regarded as a constructive rather than a resulting trust,
since the taking of the title in the name of another than the payer of the
price was not the intention of the parties when the real purchaser parted
with the purchase money. Hence it may be said that this is a fraud rectifying use of the trust device. Bogert, Trusts 101.
"-The definitions of course are not sufficiently complete or final to
answer questions like the one here raised, which must be answered for a
particular jurisdiction, in so far as they can be answered at all, by a study
of its decisions.
The following definitions are suggestive:
Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 42: "A constructive
trust is nothing but the formula through which the conscience of equity
finds expression." This is the best definition, but the following are enlightening as efforts of the courts to ease legal conscience, so to speak, from the
sin of having decided cases upon the basis of moral conscience.
Maltbie v. Olds, (1914) 88 Conn. 633, 92 Atl. 403, "Fraud, actual or
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fortunately, so many of the opinions are silent or very indefinite
about just what is meant by fraud in these situations that, after
all, we can only determine from the action taken by the court
what was the process of rationalization.
To return to the specific problem. The type of fact set-up
which has been outlined as the subject of this inquiry will be
referred to for convenience as a "strict agency case." In actual
experience with" the reported decisions it is found that most of
them involve complicating factors. Those in which it seems to
the writer that these other factors have not affected the judgment,
and may properly be regarded as immaterial, may be treated for
the present purpose as "strict agency cases." Specifically then the
present question is: In a "strict agency case, will a court of equity
compel A to ntake a conveyance to P?" If such relief is granted,
it is immaterial to the parties whether the court calls the situation
a resulting trust, or a constructive trust or fails to label it.
Whether courts decide cases by deduction from legal concepts, or
by means of hunches, and whatever factors do affect the process
of passing judgment, the truth remains that most of them do employ categories and concepts with somewhat familiar outlines and
do reason by a system which passes for deduction, when they
write their opinions. Therefore, we may with profit endeavor to
set down some of the limitations of these categories which
we have here to consider. On the other hand, one may not expect
to find any rule of mathematical certainty for determining whether,
in a particular case, a constructive trust will be raised. In the
constructive is the foundation upon which the law raises a constructive
trust."
May v. May, (1914) 161 Ky. 114, 170 S. WV. 537, "Where a trust is
raised by equity in behalf of one who has been imposed on by another, it is
enforced to work out justice and in spite of the intention of the parties."
Quinn v. Phipps, (1927) 93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419, "A constructive trust
is one raised by equity in respect of property which has been acquired by
fraud, or where though acquired originally without fraud, it is against
equity that it should be retained by him who holds it. Constructive trusts
arise purely by construction of equity, independently of an actual or presumed intention of the parties to create a trust, and are generally thrust
on the trustee for the purpose of working out the remedy. They are said
to arise from actual fraud, constructive fraud and from some equitable
principle independent of the existence of any fraud."
A typical statutory definition as found in the states having the "Field
Code," S. D. Code 1919, sec. 1194: "One who gains a thing by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust, or other wrongful
act, is, unless he has some other and better right thereto, an involuntary
trustee of the thing gained, for the benefit of the person who would otherwise have had it."
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first place, the discretionary power of a court of equity leaves

each case to be determined largely upon its individual facts as
they impress the particular chancellor. Moreover, in so far as
the opinion purports to solve the problem in a given case by the
application of well formed rules, there is still the uncertain meaning content of the word symbols making up the rules. These are
so variously interpreted that even such rules as have been attempted to be stated are but one factor and not 'necessarily the
controlling factor in any case.
There is the uncertainty as to whether the resulting trust idea
or the constructive trust notion applies. In a surprising number
of the "strict agency cases" the bill is dismissed because the court
says it finds no resulting trust in that P did not furnish any of
the purchase price.13 Sometimes the matter is dismissed with
hardly more than this statement. Again a court may find itself
moved to a discussion leading to the conclusion, so commonly put,
that "on principle and authority the plaintiff is entitled to no
relief," and "to allow a conveyance in this case would be to overturn the statute."
This type of opinion makes no reference to
the possibility of applying the constructive trust theory. So far
as the opinion reveals in many of these cases the court may never
have heard of the notion that there can be any other kind of
implied trust than a resulting trust.
There is another type of opinion in these cases which recognizes constructive trust but will not raise such a trust without a
showing of "positive fraud."" A reading of cases in which this
sIt is an extremely common experience to find a case thus disposed
of, viz: Alabama: Butts v. Cooper, (1907) 152 Ala. 375. 44 So. 616: Watkins v. Carter, (1909) 164 Ala. 456, 51 So. 318; California: Bauman v.
West, (1916) 32 Cal. App. 217, 162 Pac. 434; Indiana: Gilbert v. Carter,
(1857) 10 Ind. 16; Illinois: Furber v. Page, (1892) 143 I11.622, 32 N. E.
44; Iowa: Burden v. Sheridan, (1872) 36 Ia. 125, 14 Am. Rep. 505; Kenucky: Kimmons v. Barnes, (1924) 205 Ky. 502, 266 S. W. 891, 42 A. L. R.
I; Maryland: Nagengast v. Alz, (1901) 93 Md. 522, 49 Atd. 333; Massa-husetts: Southwick v. Spevak, (1925) 252 Mass. 354, 147 N. E. 885: New
York: Canda v. Totten, (1895) 87 Hun (N.Y.) 72, 33 N. Y. S. 962; Washington: Cushing v. Heuston, (1909) 53 Wash. 370, 102 Pac. 29.
14Bartlett v. Pickersgill, (1760) 1 Eden 515, 1 Cox Eq. Cas. 15, 4 East
578 (note).
"5Hunter v. Field, (1914) 114 Ark. 128, 169 S. W. 813. Where the
court refused to raise a trust because there was no "positive fraud." In
the present case that expression was used to mean that a mere unfulfilled
promise did not constitute fraud. Then too, we often find references to
"actual fraud," as meaning something more definite than constructive fraud.
Possibly the courts using these terms of emphasis have in mind the kind
of fraud which will support a tort action at law, an action on the case for
deceit, as for example where the defendant had a fraudulent intention at
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expression appears indicates that it is merely another way of
saying that a mere refusal to perform an oral promise alone is
not fraud.16 Perhaps "positive fraud" means there must be present all the elements necessary to constitute a cause of action in
tort for deceit. But has not equity distinguished between an action
on the case for deceit, and the kind of fraud necessary for a
cancellation, or as a defense against specific performance?
Some judges denying relief to plaintiffs in these cases evidently
recognize the inherent justice of the plaintiffs' position and refer
to the moral turpitude of a defendant who will take advantage of
the Statute of Frauds in order to avoid his moral obligation."
But, where the justice of the plaintiff's position outweighs in the
judge's mind his reverence for the sanctity of the statute, he is
very likely to point out that "the statute is for the prevention of
fraud and cannot be used as an instrument of fraud."18 And
again we come back to the word fraud. After all it comes down
to just this, if an equity judge, not restrained by local precedent,
is required to pass judgment in one of these "strict agency cases"
and decide whether or not he will order a conveyance by an agent
who had bought for himself that which he orally agreed to buy
for his principal, he will first decide for himself, "Fraud or no
fraud" and upon that will depend the result.10
Similarly there are certain characteristic rationalizations employed in the cases in which a trust is raised and a conveyance
ordered to P. These may appear singly or in combination in any
one case. It is inevitable that the statute of frauds must be faced,
and faced down, if P is to get relief. A common explanation of
the reason for granting the relief asked is that the contract upon
the time he made the promise upon which the plaintiff is relying. See
Bogert's statement of this reason as applied to cases of an oral promise by
a grantee
to hold land in trusts. Bogert, Trusts 129.
6

1 That the mere refusal to perform an oral promise is not fraud see:

Watkins v. Carter, (1909) 164 Ala. 456, 51 So. 318; Worthen v. Vogler,
(1920) 145 Ark. 161, 224 S. W. 622; Hackney v. Butts, (1883) 41 Ark. 493;
Parramore v. Hampton, (1908) 55 Fla. 672, 45 So. 992, but in so far as it
might be regarded as authority against the raising of a trust in a strict
agency case it should be considered as overruled by Quinn v. Phipps, (1927)
93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419; Kimmons v. Barnes, (1924) 205 Ky. 502, 266 S. W.
891; 17Largey v. Leggat, (1904) 30 Mont. 148, 75 Pac. 950.
Lincoln v. Chamberlain, (1923) 61 Cal. App. 399, 214 Pac. 1013.
'8 This expression will be found in very many of the cases cited in these
footnotes running back to Heard v. Pilley, (1869) 4 Ch. App. 548, 552, 38
L. J. Ch. 718, 21 L. T. 68.
19A moral argument of much vigor in favor of raising a trust in these
cases is found in the opinion of Terrell, J. in Quinn v. Phipps, (1927) 93
Fla. 805, 113 So. 419.
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which the plaintiff relies being merely a contract of agency is not
a contract for the creation of an interest in land and hence is not
covered by the statute of frauds.20 This basis of rationalization is
sometimes employed without reference to the prevention of fraud,
and upon this approach the primary problem is that of granting
specific performance and of considering whether or not damages
would not be an adequate remedy. Probably more common is the
type of opinion which approaches the problem as one of taking
the case out of the statute of frauds because of the fraud of the
agent in that he has acted in violation of a fiduciary relation. 2
If the breach of a fiduciary to his principal is a fraud, the question may be raised as to whether a mere oral agency to buy land
for another raises such a fiduciary relation as to impose this duty.
It is noticeable that even in jurisdictions which will not grant P
relief in the "strict agency cases" a general fiduciary, such as a
general trustee, an officer of a corporation, a partner, a guardian
or the like, who purchases for himself in competition with the
interests of the trust estate or other beneficiary of his fiduciary
22
duty, will hold the res so acquired as trustee for such beneficiary.
20

That a contract of agency is not a contract for the creation of an
interest in land and hence not within the statute of frauds is a formula
which has been repeated in many opinions of which the following are but
offered as samples: Quinn v. Phipps, (1927) 93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419;
Schmidt v. Beiseker, (1905) 14 N. D. 587, 105 N. W. 1102; Schrager v.
Cool, (1908) 221 Pa. St. 622, 70 Atl. 889. This is the main reliance of the
court in the leading case of Johnson v. Hayward, (1905) 74 Neb. 157, 103
N. W. 1058. This reason is also mentioned in cases wherein an agent to
purchase was to receive his commission in the form of a share of the
profits when the land should be resold. Carr v. Leavitt, (1884) 54 Mich.
540, 20 N. W. 576; Snyder v. Wolford, (1885) 33 Minn. 175, 22 N. W.
254.
2
lQuinn v. Phipps, (1927) 93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419; Harrop v. Cole,

(1916) 85 N. J. Eq. 32, 95 Ati. 378, "A constructive trust is predicated upon
a betrayal of confidence or the violation of duties arising out of a fiduciary
relation . . . assuming to act as agent establishes a fiduciary relation."

Avery v. Stewart, (1904) 136 N. C. 426, 48 S. E. 775; Trice v. Comstock,
(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1903) 121 Fed. 620.
22Partners: Elliott v. Elliott, (1907) 3 Alaska 352; Morey v. Herrick,
(1851) 18 Pa. St. 123. Corporation Officers: Church v. Sterling, (1844) 16
Conn. 388; Halsell v. Wise Coal Co., (1898) 19 Tex. Civ. App. 564, 47
S. W. 1017. Officers of Voluntary Associations: Payne v. McClure Lodge,
(Ky. Ct. of App. 1909) 115 S. W. 764. Employee: Horn Pond Ice Co.
v. Pearson, (1929) 267 Mass. 256, 166 N. E. 640. Attorney: Home Investment Co. v. Strange, (1917) 109 Tex. 342, 195 S. W. 849; Bath Hardwood
Lumber Co. v. Back Creek Co., (1924) 140 Va. 280, 125 S. 1-. 213.
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Before undertaking a discussion of particular cases or jurisdictions as to the recognition of implied trust in agency cases,
certain other situations, which are common enough to be classified
into characteristic groups, should be distinguished.
1. Where the Principal Furnishes the Moncy.-This is of
course the typical purchase-money-resulting-trust case and in the
absence of statute the principal will be permitted to establish a
trust and compel a conveyance from the agent or from a purchaser from the agent or on his behalf who was not a bona fide
purchaser for value.
2. Where the Purchase Price is a Loan.-Where it has been
agreed in advance that the agent is to advance the purchase price
or part of it as a loan to the principal. This again contains the
elements of a purchase money resulting trust and is usually disposed of on that basis. Some cases there are, which, without clear
evidence of an agreement in advance that the agent should supply
the purchase money as a loan, will nevertheless presume any payment by the agent to have been intended as a loan in view of the
other facts, and thus bring the case around into the category of
resulting trusts. Clear judicial expressions as to this sort of situation are so meager as to leave one in doubt as to when and in
what jurisdictions this sort of reasoning may be relied upon as a
basis for predicting the outcome in any undecided cases.
3. Where there has been Part Performancc of the Agreement.
-For example P has entered into possession (especially when he
was without knowledge that A had taken the title in his own
name), or he has made improvements. The cases in which this
factor has been considered as playing a part are extremely confusing from the standpoint of classifying and involve so many
factors tending to vary the simple agency situation that they will
not be considered herein. In some jurisdictions strictly addicted
to a technical construction of the statute of frauds, even a part
23

Cases dealing with all of these situations will be found in the long
annotation in 42 A. L. R. 10-125. This note undertakes to collect authorities on all types of cases wherein one person has promised orally to buy
property for another. Lists of cases will also be found in texts such as
Perry on Trusts, Bogert on Trusts and in the footnotes in the leading case

books.
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payment or the making of improvements will not be enough to
secure the plaintiff relief.
4.
Vhere Plaintiff had a Prior Interest.-If the plaintiff as
principal already had some interest in the property in question and
the defendant was engaged as agent to assist him in protecting
that interest or in perfecting his title or enlarging his estate in the
res, it is almost universally agreed that the plaintiff is entitled to
relief on the trust theory notwithstanding that the agreement with
the agent was oral. The most frequent sort of case in this group
is where the agent is employed to bid in at a judicial sale property
in which the plaintiff has an interest, which is to be sold on an
execution, foreclosure or the like. [n this sort of case the principal can usually secure a conveyance against the agent who orally
agreed to bid it in on his behalf and hold to reconvey upon tender
of his outlay or such sum as was agreed upon.
5. Where there was a pre-existing Fiduciary Relationship.24
-If
the agent who buys in competition with his principal is one
who was under some other general and prior fiduciary obligation
to the principal as a beneficiary, he will be treated as trustee of
what he has acquired in derogation of the interests of the beneficiary of the trust obligation which he owes.
6. Where the Agreement is to Purchase and Resell.-Where
the agreement between A and P was that A should acquire the
land in his own name and with his own funds and resell to P upon
request or upon the performance of some condition, A is not
chargeable as a constructive trustee. This type of an agreement
is obviously an agreement to create an interest in land and is
everywhere regarded as within the Statute of Frauds. About the
only thing which can save the rights of the principal in such a
case is to show that the agent's advance of the purchase price
was a loan. This means that a present obligation by way of debt
on the part of the principal arose as soon as the agent paid out the
purchase price. If this can be established, as has already been
explained, the way is open to work out a purchase money resulting
trust.
7. Where a purchase by A far the joint interest of himself
and P was intended.-There are numerous cases in which land is
purchased by one person for the joint interest of himself and
24

A number of cases involving this type of situation will be found collected in note 22 supra.
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other members of a partnership or joint venture, and in particular is the question of the acquisition of an interest in land by one
member of a mining partnership on behalf of the person taking
the title and others who are his partners under an oral agreement
a frequent one. It is not here proposed to go into the question of
partnership interests as defined either by the principles of common law or the uniform partnership act. Suffice it to say that a
partnership agreement is not one which under the statute of
frauds is required to be in writing, and it seems to be well understood as a rule of partnership law that where the acquisition of
interests in land is an incident to the purposes of a partnership
rights of copartners as tenants in partnership, in land acquired
by one partner and treated and used as partnership property, are
not precluded by the absence of a writing.
SELECTED ILLUSTRATIVE CASES

It is perhaps worth while in connection with the present discussion to relate some of the history of the case law on our problem and to follow that up with a presentation of some illustrative
cases and some attempt at an analysis of the opinions that appear
in them.
Apparently the first case on this problem which has been
noticed and the one to which most of the decisions unfavorable to
the raising of a trust hark back is Bartlett v. Pickersgill,an English case of 1760.2' The facts as stated in the brief note by which
the case is reported are as follows:
"The defendant bought an estate for the plaintiff, but there
was no written agreement between them, nor was any part of the
purchase money paid by the plaintiff. The defendant articled for
the estate in his own name, and refused to convey to the plaintiff;
so this bill was brought to compel a conveyance. There being no
written evidence, the question was whether the plaintiff might
give parol evidence. Lord Keeper Henley dismissed the bill without
even hearing the defendant's counsel. He said in part, 'To allow
it in this case would be to overturn the statute. .

.

. If I were to

allow the evidence in the present case, I do not know a case where
the statute would take place'."
The Lord Keeper distinguished purchase money trusts, even
where there had been only part payment by the plaintiff, as being
covered by the exception of section VIII in favor of trusts arising
by operation of law.
25(1760) 1 Eden 515, 1 Cox Eq. Cas. 15, 4 East 578, note.
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The idea of fraud and constructive trust seems not even to
have been considered by the court although the point must have
been suggested. Subsequent happenings would seem so to indicate. The plaintiff secured the defendant's conviction for perjury
for having denied upon oath that he had purchased for the plaintiff. Following this conviction the plaintiff again applied to the
court of equity to be reheard upon a supplemental bill, but was
again denied.
Following this initial case, the status of this problem in Eng20
land has been rather uncertain. In 1838 in Taylor v. Salmon,
Lord Cottenham granted specific performance of a lease to the
plaintiffs which one of the defendants as their agent had been employed to secure for them from the other party named as defendant
in the bill. The court did not develop the point as to wherein the
fraud, if any, in this case consisted. It is not definitely stated
whether there was a writing between the parties or not, and it is
pointed out that the defendant did not at the time he agreed to procure the interest in question for the plaintiff, have the fraudulent
intent of keeping the lease for himself. This case refers neither
to Bartlett v. Pickersgill nor to any other earlier case as authority.
Apparently the next case of significance is Heard v. Pilley2 1 in
which it was clearly held that a contract for the purchase of land
by an agent will be enforced against the agent, although he was
appointed by parol. It does not appear in this case that the agent
had actually taken a conveyance of the title, but he had secured
from the vendor a written contract to convey to himself. The
court referred to the bill here as one "alleging a contract entered
into in writing with the agent of the plaintiff, and praying specific
performance against the agent and the person with whom he has
entered into the contract."
The court says that this is a very ordinary bill and that it is a
startling suggestion that it cannot be sustained unless the agent
was appointed in writing. It should be noted that this case was
like Taylor z,. Salon.2 8 in that the conveyance had not yet been
made to the agent by the vendor, and it is on this ground that
Bartlett v. PickersgilI is distinguished. However Lord Justice
Selwyn goes on in his opinion to suggest that when an agent goes
to the principal and says,
26(1838) 4 My. & Cr. 134.
27(1869) 4 Ch. App. 548, 38 L. J. Ch. 718, 21 L. T. 68.
28(1838) 4 My. & Cr. 134.
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"I will buy an estate for you" and then buys it for himself and
denies the agency, it is fraud. He says that to allow the defendant's plea would be to make the statute of frauds an instrument of fraud. The concurring opinion of Gifford L. J. is even
stronger, where he says as regards Bartlett v. Pickersgill, flat, "it
seems to be inconsistent with all the authorities of this court which
proceed on the footing that it will not allow the Statute of Frauds
to be made an instrument of fraud."
It would seem that while Bartlett v. Pickersgill has not been
expressly overruled in England, its authority has been greatly
weakened by subsequent dicta. In the effort to classify all the
jurisdictions whose decisions have been examined in the effort to
determine whether, in a "strict agency case" they would go "trust,"
or "no trust," England remains in the doubtful group.
STATE OF AMERICAN AUTHORITY

As might be expected, this question is the subject of much difference of opinion in the numerous American jurisdictions. A
review of the cases in a long annotation" summarizes the cases by
listing two groups of states with about 22 as "trust" and about 14
as "no trust." The annotation mentioned undertakes to deal with
the entire topic of oral promises to buy land for another and includes one subdivision which is evidently intended to include the
sort of situations which have been herein referred to as "strict
agency cases," and which is entitled "Agreements to Negotiate
Purchase as Agent." Under this topic there is an attempt to
classify the various American jurisdictions as for and against the
raising of a trust. However, after reading the cases cited in that
list, it seems impossible categorically to assign many of the states
either to the one group or the other. In some of the states the
cases have not been "strict agency cases" and only from dicta or
analogy can they be interpreted as justifying a prediction as to the
outcome when the situation is a pure agency one. In others, the
decisions appear to be irreconcilable; dicta in later cases have
thrown doubt upon earlier ones without having clearly overruled
them. The statements in textbooks and encyclopedias are quite
as unsatisfactory as those in connection with the annotations. Mr.
Bogert in his excellent little Hornbook text, writing as late as
1921 says,30
2942 A. L. R. 10-125.
Bogert, Trusts 125.
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"Where A contracts with B that he, A, will buy real property
with the funds of B and in the name of B, and in violation of
such promise, A buys the real property in his own name and with
his own funds, equity does not find fraud on which to base a constructive trust."
He cites a preponderance of cases for this proposition and a
much smaller number as being contra. Inasmuch as there were
at the time this text was written many cases in favor of raising a
trust under such circumstances which were not cited, perhaps one
may conclude that the statement in the text expresses the author's
view.
The last edition of Perry on Trusts in a discussion dealing
generally with resulting trusts3 1 indicates that no trust will be
raised in the type of case we are considering, but in the chapter
on constructive trusts,31 2 the opposite impression is given. No attempt is made to reconcile these somewhat conflicting statements
or to indicate that there is a division of authority.
33
Mechem on Agency at one point says,
"An agent instructed to purchase property for his principal
and relied upon to buy it in the principal's name and for his direct
account, will not be permitted, without the principal's knowledge
and consent, to become the purchaser of the same property for
himself. If the property be land and is purchased with the principal's money, the agent will clearly be a trustee; and even though
he purchased with his own money, he will, nevertheless, be considered as holding the property in trust for his principal, and the
latter upon repaying or tendering him the amount of the purchase
price and his reasonable compensation, may by proper proceeding
in equity compel a conveyance to himself."
However, two sections later Mechem says :4
"In order to establish a trust in real estate, as against the
agent, if the trust be denied, it has been said to be the settled rule
that the evidence of it must, to satisfy the statute of frauds, be in
writing, or the principal must have paid or furnished the purchase money."
Among the various statements, more or less irreconcilable, to
be found at various places in the encyclopedias, the clearest exposition of the whole situation is found in the article upon Trusts
in Ruling Case Law as follows :"
"There is a conflict among the authorities as to the right of a
3iPerry, Trusts, 7th ed., sec. 134, 135.
32
Perry, Trusts 7th ed., sec. 206.
33
Mechem, Agency, 2nd ed., sec. 1192.
34Mechem, Agency, 2nd ed., sec. 1194.
8526 R. C. L. 1246: see also 39 Cyc. 171.
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person who employs another by parol to purchase an estate for him
as his agent, the title to be taken in the name of the principal,
to compel the enforcement of the contract, where the agent, in
violation of his agreement, purchases the land for himself. Where
the oral contract of agency contemplates that the agent shall take
the title in his own name, but hold it for the benefit of his principal.
it is evident that the contract is clearly within the statute, and
cannot be enforced by the principal, where the agent pays for the
property with his own money. But some cases draw a distinction
between a contract contemplating a purchase by one party in his
own name but for the benefit of another, and a contract which
contemplates not only that the purchase shall be made by one
party for the benefit of another, but also that it shall be in the
name of such other. In the latter case, it is argued that the contract cannot be deemed to be within the spirit of the statute, since
the contract is merely an agreement by one party to act as the
agent of another in conducting the negotiations for a transfer of
property from a third party to the principal, and contemplates
no transfer of land as between the two parties to the contract.
The fact that the contract contemplates a conveyance of the property as between the principal and a third party is said to be a
mere incident, and not sufficient to bring the contract of agency
within the statute. And these cases hold that it is immaterial who
pays the purchase price, since, whether paid by the principal or the
agent, a trust in favor of the principal will result from the agent's
breach of confidence in purchasing the property in violation of his
agreement."
DIscussioN OF TYPE CASES REPRESENTING THE Two VIEws

A recent case refusing to raise a trust in a case which may
fairly be classified as a "strict agency case" is Kimmnonzs v. Barnes,
a Kentucky case of 1924.6 It was here orally agreed that Kimmons would negotiate the purchase of a store building for Barnes
and others composing a partnership. Kimmons bought the premises in question, paid with his own money and then allowed the
plaintiffs to take possession and spend several thousand dollars
in making alterations and improvements. There was conflicting
testimony as to whether Kimmons did buy for the plaintiff or as
an investment for his wife. The Kentucky court, however, did
not trouble itself with the conflict in the evidence or consider it
important and said that even taking the plaintiffs' view of the
facts they were not entitled to relief. The court said:
"In this jurisdiction, where an agent goes out to purchase
property for a principal, if, in violation of the contract he pur36(1924) 205 Ky. 502, 266 S. W. 891.
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chases the property, pays the purchase price himself from his own
funds and takes the title to himself, the principal cannot compel
the agent to convey the property to him, unless the contract between them was in writing and signed by the parties."
The plaintiffs here sought to show circumstances of peculiar
hardship to them (in that the defendant had acquiesced in the expenditure for improvements) in an effort to induce the court to
distinguish this case from its former decisions. This, however,
was not allowed to control the judgment, and the court relied for
its reasons upon the authority of its own former decision in Day
v. Amburgey.37 In the latter case the court had said,
"If a person obtains the legal title to property by such arts or
acts of circumvention, imposition or fraud, or if he obtains it by
virtue of a confidential relation and influence and under such circumstances that he ought not in good conscience and equity to
enjoy the benefit, then courts of equity will raise a trust."
All this is quoted fiom Pomeroy on Equity.38 Then the court
proceeds to add that when the right depends upon an oral contract for the sale of land it is within the Statute of Frauds. Nowhere in this opinion are we told whether the court regards the
situation as in the nature of resulting trust or as being more like
the conception of constructive trusts, but just following the argument already referred to, we are told that the principal in such a
case can prevail against the agent only where he has shown a
purchase money trust, and no mention is made of the exemption
of implied trusts from the requirement of a writing, as provided
by section VIII of the statute of frauds itself. The Kentucky
court finally clinches the argument with a quotation from Sugden
on Vendors and Purchasers which even into its 15th edition had
continued to repeat a statement based on Bartlett v. Pickersgill
without any apparent recognition of the doubt which had been
thrown upon that case by later decisions. 9
As a matter of fact, not a few of the cases by which some of
the state courts first accepted the position that no trust could be
raised in the "strict agency case" relied as their sole authority
upon Sugden, Story and other text authors who wrote long prior
to the modern appreciation of the power and scope of the constructive trust.
Among the best known of the cases holding that an agent who
buys land for himself instead of for his principal is trustee are
147 Ky. 123, 143 S. W. 1033.
37(1912)
s8Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, 4th ed., sec. 1044.
39
See notes 26 and 27 supra.
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Rose v. Hayden, 40 a Kansas case, and Johnson v. Hayward,1" decided in Nebraska. The Kansas case after reviewing the authorities both ways from the days of Bartlett v. Pickersgill to current
times and after distinguishing the situation where the principal
furnishes the purchase money, says,
"A contract which has for its object the actual sale of real
estate and the transfer of the title thereto by the terms of the conIn such
tract itself, is of course within the statute of frauds ....
a case, the payment of the purchase money does not seem to count
for much. Something else must be done in order to take the contract out of the statute. And we do not think that the payment or
non-payment of the purchase-money in this case should count for
much. W*Ae
think the trust nevertheless resulted.:" The controlling
question in this case is not whether the principal advanced the
purchase-money or not, but it is whether in equity and good conscience the agent who in fact purchased the property with his own
money in his own name, in violation of his agreement with his
principal and in abuse of the confidence reposed in him by his
principal, can be allowed to retain the fruits of his perfidy."
One notes that in the course of this passage the court says the
trust "results." It is impossible to be sure whether the word
"results" is being used in the sense of the legal idiom or not. The
writer of a note in the American and English Annotated cases
seems to indicate that the word is so used for he points out that:
"In Rose v. Hayden... the court speaks of the trust created as
a resudting trust, but it is held that the trust arises out of the abuse
of the confidential relations arising out of the contract of agency;
in other words the element of fraud seems to be the determining
factor. In this view, the trust arising is perhaps not a resulting
trust but a constructive trust impressed
upon the transaction from
'4 3
reasons of equity and justice."
The Kansas court, after laboring mightily to give the reasons
why, in a strict agency case, there will be a trust, remarks that the
plaintiff had a prior interest existing before the defendant, as
agent, came into the picture. If this is the situation, it would
seem that the court need not have gone further to develop the rule
that a mere agent to purchase land in which neither party was
previously interested will be subjected to a trust. Practically all
the authorities will raise a trust in behalf of a principal who merely employs an agent to assist him in clearing his title or increasing the quantum of his estate.
40(1886) 35 Kan. 106, 10 Pac. 554, 57 Am. Rep. 145.
41(1905) 74 Neb. 157, 103 N. W. 1058, 5 L R. A. (N.S.) 112.
42 Italics are the writer's.
4312 Ann. Cas. 805.
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No state has been more emphatic or consistent in raising a
trust in what has been here designated as a strict agency case than
South Dakota. There are three South Dakota cases, all strict
agency situations, in which the trust is recognized. The first of
these cases was an action to compel the defendant agent to convey the land in controversy to the principal. 4 ' The court relied
largely on the authority of Rose v. Hayden and granted the plaintiff the relief asked for on the theory that the defendant should be
treated as a trustee. Whether the trust so raised was to be regarded as a resulting or a constructive trust is not specifically
stated, although the general trend of the language used in the
opinion sounds in terms of constructive trust. This is a strong
case in favor of the raising of a trust against the agent, because
the agent was unable to purchase the land for the price originally
authorized by the principal and in buying it on his own account
was obliged to pay more. Another strong position, indicated by
the opinion in this case, is the court's statement that under the
agreement it might even have been proper for the agent to take
title in his own name, but that he would still have been a trustee.
A year later the same rule was applied in Morris v. Riegalar in
which the court referred to the previous case as containing a sufficient discussion of the principles involved. When the question
arose again in 192246 the problem was merely that of determining
that the facts were such as to bring the case within the rule already laid down.
New Jersey formerly presented a confused and curious group
of cases which left one in uncertainty as to whether a trust would
be raised in a strict agency case or not.4 ' However in 1914 liarrop v. Cole, 8 a strict agency case, expressly overruled the earlier
cases which refused to treat an agent as a trustee. This case is
important for the careful distinction which is made between con44Brookings Land and Trust Co. v. Bertness, (1903) 17 S. D. 293, 96
N. W. 97.
45
Morris v. Riegel, (1904) 19 S. D. 26, 101 N. W. 1086.
4GBailey v. Colombe, (1922) 45 S. D. 443, 188 N. W. 203.
47Wallace v. Brown, (1855) 10 N. J. Eq. 308, a strict agency case:
Nestal v. Schmidt, (1878) 29 N. J. Eq. 458, not a strict agency case and
no trust raised. On the other hand, Seacoast Ry. v. Wood, (1903) 65 N. J.
Eq. 530, 56 Ati. 337 where an agent who, as an officer of a corporation for
which he was authorized to buy land, purchased it in his own name was
held to be a trustee. Then in 1909 in Rogers v. Genung, 76 N. J. Eq. 306.
74 Atl. 473 the old rule was apparently repudiated but not clearly so as the
case was not a pure "agency to buy land" situation.
48(1914) 85 N. J. Eq. 32, 95 Ati. 378.
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structive and resulting trusts. It is pointed out that this type case
is one of constructive trust. The court says,
"A constructive trust is predicated upon betrayal of confidence
or the violation of duties arising out of a fiduciary relation. A
fiduciary relation may be established in numerous ways. It is a
mere incident that it happens in a particularcase to arise out of a
verbal agreement. Equity will not tolerate a betrayal of confidence
and it 49
makes no difference how this confidence has becen obtained
Minnesota is one of the states which, superficially at least,
seems to take the position that the statute of frauds stands in the
way of giving the principal the right to enforce a contract of
agency to buy land as against an agent who has acquired it for
himself with his own money.
Dougan v. Bemis,5" decided in 1905, was apparently relied on
by the compiler of the note in American Law Reports as a basis
for including Minnesota among the "non-trust" states. In this
case plaintiff and defendant owned lots on either side of a vacant
lot. Taking the somewhat conflicting evidence as favoring the
plaintiff's point of view, it was orally agreed that the defendant
would negotiate for the purchase of the lot in question for their
joint benefit. The defendant, however, purchased the lot alone
and refused to convey any part of it to the plaintiff. The court
refused to compel a conveyance, saying:
"The most favorable inference for the plaintiff is that the relation of principal and agent existed between the parties, whereby
the defendant, Mrs. Bemis, agreed as agent of the plaintiff to
purchase for her one-half of the lot; and that the defendant in
violation of such agency secured a conveyance of the whole lot
for her own use and refused to convey any portion thereof to the
plaintiff. . . . The question, then, in its last analysis, is whether,
from these facts a trust resulted in favor of the plaintiff in half
o~f the lot which equity will enforce. The rule of law applicable
to this question is well settled on principle and authority. It is
thus: If an agent to purchase real estate for another with money
furnished by him takes the title thereto in his own name without
the assent of his principal, he will hold the legal title as trustee for
his principal. But if the agent in such a case buys with his own
money, and the principal advances no part of the purchase price,
and the rights of the principal rest upon a verbal agreement which
is denied, no resulting trust will arise, and the case will fall within
the statute of frauds." 5'
9
Italics the writer's.
50(1905) 95 Minn. 220, 103 N. W. 882.
511talics the writer's.
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It is submitted that this case should not be regarded as finally
settling the rule in Minnesota for certain reasons to be pointed out.
In the first place, it does not appear clearly whether the understanding was that the defendant was to acquire the entire lot and
then convey a part of it or an undivided interest therein to the
plaintiff, or, whether, on the other hand, she was intended to act
as an agent to negotiate for its sale by the former owner and procure separate conveyances to herself and the plaintiff. Secondly,
the court seems to put this decision entirely on the resulting trust
concept, entirely ignoring the existence of the doctrine of constructive trust. Lewis, J., in concurring that there should be a
new trial, said he did not wish to be understood as holding that
the evidence would not justify a holding that the defendant was
a trustee ex maleficio. Moreover, the court here was too sure
that the law on this point was well settled. The only authorities
cited for this position were texts. The opinion goes on to admit
that there are contrary cases, citing Rose v. Hayden as an example.
In Sieger v. Sieger in 192552 the Minnesota court seems to be
more conscious of the breadth of the doctrine of constructive
trusts and effectively uses it to take a purchase money trust out
of the Minnesota statute which was intended to eliminate purchase
money resulting trusts in those cases where the person supplying
the purchase price deliberately consented and arranged to have the
title taken in the name of the party acting as agent to make the
purchase.
The Minnesota situation is typical of that in many jurisdictions in which the only cases to be found upon the specific type
of situation in mind here are dismissed upon the ground that they
are not resulting trusts and without the slightest indication in the
opinion that the court is at all aware of the doctrine of coitstrtctive trusts.
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52(1925) 162 Minn. 332, 202 N. W. 742.
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Wentworth v. Wentworth, (1858) 2 Minn. 238. The plaintiff located
on government land and improved it. He allowed his brother, the defendant, to enter it in his own name on an oral agreement to convey it to plaintiff upon payment of the purchase price. Action for specific performance.
Held for defendant. The contract is within the statute of frauds. Mere
possession and the making of improvements are not such part performance
as will take it out of the statute of frauds. The court says "The defendant
has incurred the odium of a violator of a sacred trust and we reluctantly
confess our inability under the law to aid the plaintiff."
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SUM MARY

Is it desirable that the judicial process should lend itself to
aiding the intending purchaser of real estate who makes an oral
agreement with an agent to act for him in negotiating the deal?
This is the value judgment which must precede fact judgments in
particular cases. It is obviously impossible and probably undesirable to expect courts to react identically on this point. To some
the sacro-sanctity of the statute of frauds will be paramount. The
point of view of others may be, as shown by the expressions so
often used, to the effect that equity will not allow the statute of
frauds be used as an instrument of fraud, or that the agent may
not profit by his perfidy in violating the confidence reposed in him
in his fiduciary relationship.
But what do these words mean? What is fraud? Is it a
breach of confidence to refuse to perform an oral agreement? Is
it fraud to refuse to perform an oral agreement, particularly when
it cannot be shown that the promise was made with an intention
of not performing it?
Once it appears that a court knows what a constructive trust
is, and is willing to recognize that resulting trusts are not the only
sort of implied trusts but that there is another variety even
broader and more indefinite, then comes the problem of delimiting
that field and determining whether the conduct of an agent, who
decides to pick up a bargain for himself instead of letting his
principal have the benefit of it, is fraud, or in some way so culpable
that equity should exercise its power over the situation. What is
there about the conduct of such an agent which smells so unsavory?
Some of the courts which refuse relief in these premises admit
that the defendant is a dastardly fellow and should be ashamed
of himself. But they are afraid of the statute of frauds. Is it a
breach of fiduciary duty to do something contrary to an oral agreement when the subject matter is the sort that the statute of frauds
has something to say about? Or must we say that when parties
are dealing with real estate oral promises don't count? Is an
agency to buy real estate for another a contract to create an interest in real estate? All these are questions which the equity court
must consider. The statute of frauds itself does not answer them.
The court in each particular case must answer them to its own
satisfaction. No statute can mean more than the judge who is
applying it thinks it means in reference to the situation upon which
he has the responsibility of passing judgment.
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No statute has yet been drawn which is so self executing that
it is not necessary for some human intelligence, acting as the
agency of the state for its administration, to decide whether the
rule of law expressed by the statute applies to the fact set-up at
hand. The judicial process works identically, whether there is a
statute involved or not. The question which the court must answer
is simply this: Which (if any) of the rules of law invoked by the
parties, or known to the court, extend their protection to the
interests asserted by these parties?
There are certainly at least two lines of approach to this sttuation which will enable a court to give relief to the plaintiff without
doing too great violence to the statute of frauds. The two lines
of orthodox legal deduction which may be employed to rationalize
a recognition of the interest of the plaintiff in this type of case
have been repeatedly referred to and may be restated as brief
rules.
1. An agency creates a fiduciary duty, and an agent who
acquires property by conduct inconsistent with the duty arising
out of that fiduciary relation will be deemed to hold such property
in constructive trust for his principal.
2. A contract by which one agrees to act as an agent to purchase land from a third person in the name of his principal is not
a contract to create an interest in land, but is purely a contract
of agency and is not within the statute of frauds.
These rules have been cast in perfectly orthodox terminology
and have probably been asserted in some connection or other by
most courts. Of course they do not automatically decide cases,
but neither does the statute of frauds. But if a court wants to
give the plaintiff his relief, as even some of them in the "nontrust" states apparently wanted to do, and lacks the tools to (10 so
in conformity with orthodox "legal reasoning," the above formulas
should serve. 54 Either one may be used by itself, or they can be
judiciously (or judicially) mixed and seasoned with other rules
and doctrines to taste. In any event, the relief will be the same.
Compel the agent who has taken the title in his own name to convey it to the principal upon tender of price paid plus expenses of
the purchase and commission."
54
This lack of adequate tools is exactly what the Minnesota court
refers to in the passage quoted in note 53 supra.
55"A decree will be advised, establishing a constructive trust on behalf
of the complainants, and directing the defendants to execute the trust by
conveying the land to the complainants upon payment of the price." Stevenson, V. C., in Harrop v. Cole, (1915) 85 N. J. Eq. 32, 95 Atl. 378.
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It has merely happened that the trust device has been the word
formula employed to compel the performance of various ethical
duties which Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence has more or less intuitively sensed. When the ethical duty impressed the tribunal having the
responsibility of passing judgment sufficiently, a suitable formula
will be selected (or devised) and applied, and, whether or not the
statute of frauds will be permitted to interfere, will depend upon
the particular judge's conception of the policy and function of the
statute of frauds. The probability that a judge will select the
most adaptable formula for reaching and rationalizing an acceptable judgment in any case will depend upon what formulas he
has in mind. Counsel for the parties if they are to serve the best
interests of their clients must be diligent in bringing to the attention of the court the theories, rules and formulas which will best
serve their respective purposes. In the type of case discussed in
this paper this cannot be done unless counsel adequately appreciate
the scope and application of the constructive and resulting trust
concepts and the distinctions between them. From numerous references above it appears that in many cases the courts have used
the term "resulting trust" in such a way as to indicate a failure
fully to realize the distinction. It is perhaps not unreasonable
to suspect that counsel may have been at fault in failing to point
out this distinction in briefs and arguments.
It has not been the primary purpose in this discussion to deal
with the question whether there is less danger of fraud in the
"strict agency" cases than in other case of oral promise to convey
land. It has been the purpose rather to show that in this type of
case probably the weight of authority and the better value judgment is in favor of imposing a trust on the real estate agent who
buys for himself instead of for his employer or principal. However, the question may well be raised whether there may not be
less danger of perjured testimony than in cases where the title has
been conveyed to the defendant by the plaintiff or taken by him
with the plaintiff's knowledge upon his oral promise to convey to
the plaintiff. It may also be asked whether the position of a real
estate agent is not such as to raise a more clearly recognizable
fiduciary duty than oral promises between parties not standing
in that relation. The recent Wisconsin case of Krz-,sko v. Gaudynski 56 makes a special point of the status of a real estate agent
to his client as imposing a fiduciary duty such as has been tradi5o(1932) 207 Wis. 608, 242 N. W. 186. See also note 5 supra.
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tionally accepted as a basis for taking a case out of the statute of
frauds. In this case the court says: "The ground of the decision
in the Spilmore Case5 7 was the confidential relationship of the
defendant to the widow and children for whom he acted. Such a
relationship exists between any agent and the principal for whom
he acts." After distinguishing other Wisconsin cases in which
no trust was imposed the court continues:
"In none of these cases did the defendant assume to act as
real estate agent to negotiate for the purchase of lands. Such
agents are now licensed, and their license is in a sense an invitation to the public to repose trust and confidence in them. Their
relation to their principals is similar to that of one admitted to practice law to his client. . . We see no reason why the obligation of
faithfulness is not as strong in the one case as the other."
In times like the present when land values are decreasing it is
not likely that we shall find the courts faced with the problem
covered by this discussion. If any litigation on this point arises
in the immediate future, it is more likely that it will be initiated
by the agent who, having made a purchase for a principal who
has not supplied him with funds in advance, finds himself with the
title of real estate which he does not want and which is declining
in price. Authority on this side of the picture seems to be almost
totally lacking, and furthermore the discussion of the agent's rights
and powers in such a situation involves considerations not pertinent
to this paper.
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Roller v. Spilmore, (1860) 13 Wis. 26. This was an early Wisconsin case holding an agent to purchase land who took title for himself was a
trustee for his principal.

